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Abstract
Manipulating video content is easier than ever.
Due to the misuse potential of manipulated con-
tent, multiple detection techniques that analyze
the pixel data from the videos have been pro-
posed. However, clever manipulators should also
carefully forge the metadata and auxiliary header
information, which is harder to do for videos
than images. In this paper, we propose to iden-
tify forged videos by analyzing their multimedia
stream descriptors with simple binary classifiers,
completely avoiding the pixel space. Using well-
known datasets, our results show that this scalable
approach can achieve a high manipulation detec-
tion score if the manipulators have not done a
careful data sanitization of the multimedia stream
descriptors.
1. Introduction
Video manipulation is now within reach of any individual.
Recent improvements in the machine learning field have
enabled the creation of powerful video manipulation tools.
Face2Face (Thies et al., 2016), Recycle-GAN (Bansal et al.,
2018), Deepfakes (Korshunov & Marcel, 2018), and other
face swapping techniques (Korshunova et al., 2017) embody
the latest generation of these open source video forging
methods. It is assumed as a certainty both by the research
community (Brundage et al., 2018) and governments across
the globe (Vincent, 2018; Chesney & Citron, 2018) that
more complex tools will appear in the near future. Classical
and current video editing methods have already demon-
strated dangerous potential, having been used to generate
political propaganda (Bird, 2015), revenge-porn (Curtis,
2018), and child-exploitation material (Cole, 2018).
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Figure 1. Examples of some of the information extracted from
the video stream descriptors. These descriptors are necessary to
decode and playback a video.
Due to the ever increasing sophistication of these techniques,
uncovering manipulations in videos remains an open prob-
lem. Existing video manipulation detection solutions focus
entirely on the observance of anomalies in the pixel domain
of the video. Unfortunately, it can be easily seen from a
game theoretic perspective that, if both manipulators and
detectors are equally powerful, a Nash equilibrium will be
reached (Stamm et al., 2012a). Under that scenario, both
real and manipulated videos will be indistinguishable from
each other, and the best detector will only be capable of ran-
dom guessing. Hence, methods that look beyond the pixel
domain are critically needed. So far, little attention has been
paid to the necessary metadata and auxiliary header infor-
mation that is embedded in every video. As we shall present,
this information can be exploited to uncover unskilled video
content manipulators.
In this paper, we introduce a new approach to address the
video manipulation detection problem. To avoid the zero-
sum, leader-follower game that characterizes current detec-
tion solutions, our approach completely avoids the pixel
domain. Instead, we use the multimedia stream descrip-
tors (Jack, 2007) that ensure the playback of any video (as
shown in Figure 1). First, we construct a feature vector with
all the descriptor information for a given video. Using a
database of known manipulated videos, we train an ensem-
ble of a support vector machine and a random forest that
acts as our detector. Finally, during testing, we generate the
feature vector from the stream descriptors of the video under
analysis, feed it to the ensemble, and report a manipulation
probability.
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The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
First, we introduce a new technique that does not require
access to the pixel content of the video, making it fast and
scalable, even on consumer grade computing equipment.
Instead, we rely on the multimedia descriptors present on
any video, which are considerably harder to manipulate due
to their role in the decoding phase. Second, we thoroughly
test our approach using the NIST MFC datasets (Guan et al.,
2019) and show that even with a limited amount of labeled
videos, simple machine learning ensembles can be highly
effective detectors. Finally, all of our code and trained clas-
sifiers will be made available1 so the research community
can reproduce our work with their own datasets.
2. Related Work
The multimedia forensics research community has a long
history of trying to address the problem of detecting manip-
ulations in video sequences. (Milani et al., 2012) provide
an extensive and thorough overview of the main research
directions and solutions that have been explored in the last
decade. More recent work has focused on specific video
manipulations, such as local tampering detection in video se-
quences (Stamm et al., 2012b; Bestagini et al., 2013), video
re-encoding detection (Bian et al., 2014; Bestagini et al.,
2016), splicing detection in videos (Hsu et al., 2008; Mul-
lan et al., 2017; Mandelli et al., 2018), and near-duplicate
video detection (Bayram et al., 2008; Lameri et al., 2017).
(D’Amiano et al., 2015; 2019) also present solutions that use
3D PatchMatch (Barnes et al., 2009) for video forgery detec-
tion and localization, whereas (D’Avino et al., 2017) suggest
using data-driven machine learning based approaches. So-
lutions tailored to detecting the latest video manipulation
techniques have also been recently presented. These include
the works of (Li et al., 2018; Gu¨era & Delp, 2018) on detect-
ing Deepfakes and (Ro¨ssler et al., 2018; Matern et al., 2019)
on Face2Face (Thies et al., 2016) manipulation detection.
As covered by (Milani et al., 2012), image-based forensics
techniques that leverage camera noise residuals (Khanna
et al., 2008), image compression artifacts (Bianchi & Piva,
2012), or geometric and physics inconsistencies in the
scene (Bulan et al., 2009) can also be used in videos when
applied frame by frame. In (Fan et al., 2011) and (Huh
et al., 2018), Exif image metadata is used to detect either
image brightness and contrast adjustments, and splicing ma-
nipulations in images, respectively. Finally, (Iuliani et al.,
2019) use video file container metadata for video integrity
verification and source device identification. To the best
of our knowledge, video manipulation detection techniques
that exploit the multimedia stream descriptors have not been
previously proposed.
1https://github.com/dguera/fake-video-
detection-without-pixels
3. Proposed Method
Current video manipulation detection approaches rely on un-
covering manipulations by studying pixel domain anomalies.
Instead, we propose to use the multimedia stream descrip-
tors of videos as our main source of information to spot
manipulated content. To do so, our method works in two
stages, as presented in Figure 2. First, during the training
phase, we extract the multimedia stream descriptors from
a labeled database of manipulated and pristine videos. In
practice, such a database can be easily constructed using
a limited amount of manually labeled data coupled with a
semi-supervised learning approach, as done by (Zannettou
et al., 2018). Then, we encode these descriptors as a feature
vector for each given video. We apply median normaliza-
tion to all numerical features. As for categorical features,
each is encoded as its own unique numerical value. Once
we have processed all the videos in the database, we use
all the feature vectors to train different binary classifiers as
our detectors. More specifically, we use a random forest,
a support vector machine (SVM) and an ensemble of both
detectors. The best hyperparameters for each detector are
selected by performing a random search cross-validation
over a 10-split stratified shuffling of the data and 1,000 tri-
als per split. Figure 2a summarizes this first stage. In our
implementation, we use ffprobe (Bellard et al., 2019) for the
multimedia stream descriptor extraction. For the encoding
of the descriptors as feature vectors, we use pandas (McK-
inney, 2010) and scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011). As
for the training and testing of the SVM, the random forest,
and the ensemble, we use the implementations available in
the scikit-learn library.
Figure 2b shows how our method would work in practice.
Given a suspect video, we extract its stream descriptors and
generate its corresponding feature vector, which is normal-
ized based on the values learnt during the training phase.
Since some of the descriptor fields are optional, we perform
additional post-processing to ensure that the feature vector
can be processed by our trained detector. Concretely, if any
field is missing in the video stream descriptors, we perform
data imputation by mapping missing fields to a fixed numer-
ical value. If previously unseen descriptor fields are present
in the suspect video stream, they are ignored and not in-
cluded in the corresponding suspect feature vector. Finally,
the trained detector analyzes the suspect feature vector and
computes a manipulation probability.
It is important to note that although our approach may be
vulnerable to video re-encoding attacks, this is traded off for
scalability, a limited need of labeled data, and a high video
manipulation detection score, as we present in Section 4.
Also, the fact that our solution is orthogonal to pixel-based
methods and requires limited amounts of data, which means
that ideally, we could use both approaches simultaneously.
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Figure 2. (a) Block diagram of the training stage of our proposed method. We process a labeled database of manipulated and pristine
videos to generate a feature vector for each video from its multimedia stream descriptors. These feature vectors are then used to train and
select the best detector (b) Block diagram of the testing stage of our proposed method. Given a suspect video, a feature vector is generated
and processed by the previously selected detector. Finally, a manipulation probability for the suspect video is reported.
Our approach could be used to quickly identify manipulated
videos, minimizing the need to rely on human annotation.
Later, these newly labeled videos could be used to improve
the performance of pixel-based video manipulation detec-
tors. Finally, following the recommendations of (Brundage
et al., 2018), we want to reflect on a potential misuse of the
proposed approach. We believe that our approach could be
misused by someone with access to large amounts of labeled
video data. Using that information, a malevolent adversary
could identify specific individuals, such as journalists or con-
fidential informants, who may submit anonymous videos
using the same devices they use to upload videos to social
media websites. To avoid this, different physical devices or
proper video data sanitization should be used.
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Datasets
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed ap-
proach, we use the Media Forensics Challenge (MFC)
datasets (Guan et al., 2019). Collected by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), this data
comprises over 11,000 high provenance videos and 4,000
manipulated videos. In our experiments, we use the videos
from the following datasets for training, hyper-parameter
selection, and validation: the Nimble Challenge 2017 de-
velopment dataset, the MFC18 development version 1 and
version 2 datasets, and the MFC18 GAN dataset. This rep-
resents a total of 677 videos, of which 167 are manipulated.
For testing our model, we use the MFC18 evaluation dataset
and the MFC19 validation dataset, which have a total of
1,097 videos. Of those videos, 336 have been manipulated.
4.2. Experimental Setup
To show the merits of our method in terms of scalability
and limited compute requirements, we design the following
experiment. First, we select machine learning binary clas-
sifiers that are well known for their modeling capabilities,
even with limited access to training samples. As previously
mentioned, we use a random forest, a support vector ma-
chine, and a soft voting classification ensemble with both.
This final ensemble is weighted 4 to 1 in favor of the deci-
sion of the random forest. Then, to show the performance of
each detector under different data availability scenarios, we
train them using 10%, 25%, 50% and 75% of the available
training data. We use a stratified shuffle splitting policy to
select these training subsets, meaning that the global ratio of
manipulated to non-manipulated videos of the entire training
set is preserved in the subsets. In all scenarios, a sequestered
25% subset of the training data is used for hyper-parameter
selection and validation. Finally, the best validated model is
selected for testing. Due to the imbalance of manipulated to
non-manipulated videos, we use the Precision-Recall (PR)
curve as our evaluation metric, as recommended by (Saito
& Rehmsmeier, 2015). We also report the F1 score, the
area under the curve (AUC) score, and the average precision
(AP) score for each classifier.
4.3. Results and Discussion
As we can see in Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6,
under all scenarios the voting ensemble of the random forest
and the support vector machine generally achieves the best
overall results, followed by the random forest and the SVM.
More specifically, our best ensemble model achieves a F1
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Figure 3. PR curves, F1 score, AUC score, and AP score on the test
set for all the trained models using 10% of the available training
data (68 videos).
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Figure 4. PR curves, F1 score, AUC score, and AP score on the test
set for all the trained models using 25% of the available training
data (169 videos).
score of 0.917, an AUC score of 0.984 and an AP score of
0.984. To contextualize these results, we have included the
performance of a binary classifier baseline which predicts a
video manipulation with probability p = 0.306. This corre-
sponds to the true fraction of manipulated videos in the test
set. Note that it is higher than the fraction of manipulated
videos in the training subsets, which is 0.247. This baseline
model would achieve an F1, AUC, and AP score of 0.306.
We can see that our best model is three times better than
the baseline in all reported metrics. Notice that, as seen in
Figure 3, the ensemble trained with 68 videos has achieved
equal or better results than the ensembles trained with more
videos. This shows that, even with a very limited number
of stream descriptors, a properly tuned machine learning
model can be trained easily to spot video manipulations.
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Figure 5. PR curves, F1 score, AUC score, and AP score on the test
set for all the trained models using 50% of the available training
data (339 videos).
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Figure 6. PR curves, F1 score, AUC score, and AP score on the test
set for all the trained models using 75% of the available training
data (508 videos).
5. Conclusion
Up until now, most video manipulation detection techniques
have focused on analyzing the pixel data to spot forged
content. In this paper, we have shown how simple machine
learning classifiers can be highly effective at detecting video
manipulations when the appropriate data is used. More
specifically, we use an ensemble of a random forest and an
SVM trained on multimedia stream descriptors from both
forged and pristine videos. With this approach, we have
achieved an extremely high video manipulation detection
score while requiring very limited amounts of data. Based
on our findings, our future work will focus on techniques
that automatically perform data sanitization. This will allow
us to remove metadata and auxiliary header information that
may give away sensitive information such as the source of
the video.
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